

Talent Think Tank Campus Europe (TTT CAMPUS.EU)
Piazza IV Novembre 4, Milano, 20124
Tel +39 02 671658022
www.tttcampus.eu



REALIGNING EUROPE'S INDO- PACIFIC APPROACH

2026

Talent Think Tank Campus Europe – Analysis

NAVIGATING SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN LIGHT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Navigating Security and Economic Challenges in Light of the War in Ukraine

Traditionally, the EU has perceived the Indo-Pacific mainly through the lenses of economic cooperation. However, recent events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine or the re-election of Donald Trump as US president, have only increased the debate on other aspects of the EU's approach to the region, such as traditional security or forming new partnerships and alliances to serve as a counterbalance to China.

The Indo-Pacific region has become increasingly important to the European Union's (EU) foreign policy in recent years. This shift is driven by the region's economic importance and the need to strengthen ties with Asian partners. However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had profound implications for European security, forcing the EU to shift its foreign policy focus back to its borders. At the same time, the full-scale invasion highlighted some of the issues connected to global security, which have already been present but are now seen as pressing, such as the resilience of supply chains and societies against disinformation or cyber security. Some analysts argue this shift has redirected the EU's resources and security attention away from the Indo-Pacific [1], limiting its ability to engage militarily in the region as it concentrates on strengthening NATO and reinforcing European defences. Others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a confirmation that the Indo-Pacific and European security are interconnected, particularly considering the growing alignment between China and Russia [2]. Considering these complexities, the EU will have to recalibrate its Indo-Pacific strategy in several aspects.

So far, the full extent of the changes is unclear. However, the EU may need to focus more strategically on selected priorities in the future [3], such as economic security, its competitiveness or its increased role in global security. Thus, some consequences of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine also emphasised the EU's interests in the Indo-Pacific. The economic fallout of the war, including disruptions to energy supplies and global markets, has made

NAVIGATING SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN LIGHT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

member states reconsider the architecture of European security and highlighted the importance of secure and resilient supply chains. For instance, vulnerabilities in energy and critical goods supply have emerged, underscoring the need for diversification as a strategic priority. These disruptions have emphasised the need to focus on the Indo-Pacific from a geopolitical standpoint. Any potential conflict involving China could similarly destabilise global trade routes and profoundly impact European economies, necessitating continued strategic engagement. Therefore, maintaining and furthering such engagement in the Indo-Pacific is essential for protecting Europe's broader economic and geopolitical interests.

Considering these complexities, the EU has had to recalibrate its Indo-Pacific strategy in several aspects. Traditionally, the EU has perceived the Indo-Pacific mainly through the lenses of economic cooperation. However, recent events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine or the re-election of Donald Trump as US president, have only increased the debate on other aspects of the EU's approach to the region, such as traditional security or forming new partnerships and alliances to serve as a counterbalance to China. The EU's approach may become more strategically focused on selected priorities in the future. This paper thus explores the likely direction of the shift in the EU's approach to the region in these two aspects: security and alliances. It first briefly presents the Indo-Pacific as a concept, then dives into the two elements of EU-Indo-Pacific cooperation, and lastly, briefly discusses the potential effects of the recent US election results on the whole regional dynamics.

The Indo-Pacific: A Rising Concept

The Indo-Pacific concept refers to a strategic and geopolitical framework that emphasises the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Although often vaguely defined or used differently by various actors [4], it underscores the region's critical role in global trade, security, and political dynamics. Key countries include India, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and Vietnam and extend to countries from East Africa to the Pacific Islands [5]. While the region encompasses China, the Indo-Pacific has evolved to signify a counterbalance to China's rising influence within the Euro-Atlantic sphere, even if China is not explicitly named in official documents [6].

Initially driven by economic interests, the EU's approach to the Indo-Pacific has broadened to include additional objectives such as promoting sustainable development regional stability [7]. The publication of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 [8] marked a pivotal shift, emphasising not only the economic significance of the region but also the importance of collaboration on global challenges, including climate change, digital transformation, and maritime security. For example, the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) is implemented within the Northwestern Indian Ocean. Through the CMP, the EU member states can coordinate their regional naval assets to act more effectively to promote rules-based order within the area [9]. Furthermore, the strategy highlights the need for strengthened security and diplomatic partnerships to counterbalance geopolitical tensions, promote open sea lanes, and ensure adherence to international law. The EU also aims to deepen trade ties through, for example, new free trade agreements being negotiated with countries such as Indonesia [10] or the Philippines [11], efforts that precede the strategy itself but may get new momentum. This strategic approach to the region is expected to continue within the new EU Commission. Von der Leyen drove the EU strategy shift and will likely continue this term. Also, the new High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, is known for a similar stricter stance on China [12].

THE INTERPLAY OF SECURITY BETWEEN INDO-PACIFIC AND EUROPE

The interplay of security between Indo-Pacific and Europe

Initially driven by economic interests, the EU's approach to the Indo-Pacific has evolved to encompass broader objectives, including promoting sustainable development and enhancing regional stability. Over time, the EU has recognised the Indo-Pacific as a critical region for upholding global security [13]. This shift has been further emphasised by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which not only refocused European attention on security but also underscored the importance of strengthening the EU's strategic role in global affairs. This was exemplified by the unprecedented appointment of an EU Commissioner for Defence and Space [14]. As security challenges grow increasingly interconnected, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a focal point for the EU's security and defence cooperation, with discussions often centred on enhancing partnerships to address maritime security, cyber threats, and the broader geopolitical balance in the region [15].

Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU had been focusing on its security cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. That is a dimension included in the EU Indo-Pacific strategy [16] and strategies of several EU member states such as Germany [17], France [18], and the Netherlands [19], which are militarily present in the region. France, with its territorial presence in the Indo-Pacific, has long been the leading EU actor in the area [20]. The security of the Indo-Pacific and the EU has been increasingly seen as interconnected from the European point of view. This has been, for example, highlighted recently by the involvement of North Korea in the Russian invasion of Ukraine [21] or via the partnership without limits between China and Russia [22], which continuously, although sometimes cautiously, signals support for the Russian position [23]. The Russian invasion highlighted this interconnectedness and the growing need to prioritise security. It sparked a debate about the EU's realistic ability to expand its already modest presence in the Indo-Pacific, given the pressing demands on its capacities in Europe or the Middle East [24].

THE INTERPLAY OF SECURITY BETWEEN INDO-PACIFIC AND EUROPE

The EU's engagement in the Indo-Pacific as a security actor has steadily expanded through multilateral and bilateral channels. Security cooperation is a part of the EU-ASEAN partnership [25], reinforced by regular leader-level summits and collaboration in various areas. The EU participates in key regional fora, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, and engages in dialogue through platforms like the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Bilateral ties, such as those with Japan, complement these efforts, alongside freedom of navigation exercises conducted by EU member states. This cooperation is a two-way street. Japan is part of the Lithuanian-led demining coalition for Ukraine [26], and South Korea is a significant arms supplier for Ukraine and Poland [27]. The EU faces uncertainty about enhancing its presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly given the strain on its resources from crises in Europe and the Middle East [28]. Many European governments have already increased their spending on defence and will invest in the reconstitution of Ukraine in the future. With other priorities at the EU level, such as the Global Gateway strategy aimed at increased investments in global infrastructure, the capacity to engage militarily in the Indo-Pacific remains limited [29].

Besides material resources, maintaining a coherent and effective strategy will depend on reconciling member states' differing priorities and ensuring that Europe's Indo-Pacific engagements are sustained and strategically aligned. The diversity of perspectives among EU member states, particularly regarding China, challenges the cohesion and effectiveness of the EU's Indo-Pacific engagement. Some countries, like Germany [30], are more hesitant to oppose China directly. Furthermore, these divisions can be seen in the fact that although more EU member states have a specific strategic document on the Indo-Pacific and the EU strategy, many member states still perceive the role of the strategies differently [31]. These internal divisions may further complicate the European Union's capability to act decisively in a security crisis in the Indo-Pacific region, especially if the crisis requires swift coordination among member states of the EU.

MAINTAINING SOLID ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Maintaining solid alliances in the Indo-Pacific

1. Drivers of Effective Engagement

Strong partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries are essential for achieving several goals of the EU, such as increased competitiveness or strengthened security, both economic and traditional. New alliances are needed to secure their supply chains and to lower the dependency on China in areas such as the supply of raw materials. However, in the traditional security domain, the rule of law in the region must also be maintained.

Nonetheless, establishing new relationships within the region presents challenges, many of which are primarily normative. So far, the EU has been focusing on regional partnerships with like-minded countries, such as Japan or South Korea, to mitigate security risks and reduce economic dependencies on China. However, in pursuing new partnerships, every EU member state has been increasing its diplomatic presence or considering new alliances with countries such as India or Vietnam, whose governance systems, characterised by varying degrees of democratic principles, differ from those of established liberal democracies [32]. Many Indo-Pacific countries ran very low on democracy as measured by both the Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Both institutions rank 23% of the countries as either not free or authoritarian, respectively [33]. Others considered more democratic still face several challenges. For example, India, which is regarded as a potential strong partner in the region by the EU [34], has been under the government of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, and the government with Prime Minister Modi has been criticised for targeting political opponents and religious minorities through governmental institutions and for excessive corruption [35].

Balancing strategic interests, such as trade and security, with its commitment to democratic governance poses a challenge, potentially weakening the EU's global influence and authority. The EU often attaches conditionality to its partnerships to promote its normative principles through trade and cooperation. However, engaging with non-democratic countries in the region

MAINTAINING SOLID ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

risks undermining its coherence as an international actor, a critique sometimes levelled against its foreign policy approach [36]. The diverse regional reactions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine showed that gaining support on issues critical to European security within the area might be difficult for the EU. While countries like Japan and Australia [37] have aligned with the EU's stance on Russia, others, like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have maintained a cautious stance or oppose the EU's stance based on their political ties to Russia and China. Only the Philippines and Singapore have taken a more explicit position, expressing direct support for Ukraine in its defence against Russia's invasion [38].

As discussed, the EU focuses on increasing regional relations within its strategy. Some EU member states have similar strategies, such as Czechia [39], Lithuania [40], and the Netherlands [41]. Most of them highlight increased diplomatic presence in the region as one of their goals, creating new posts such as the Czech special representative for Indo-Pacific [42] or cyber attaché for the Indo-Pacific region [43]. Such increased presence is significant in terms of increased future cooperation. It should be continued, even at the EU level under the new EU Commission or within the framework of Global Gateway.

The role of the US in EU-Indo-Pacific policy

The Indo-Pacific represents a critical arena for both EU and U.S. strategic interests, yet their approaches reveal key differences and areas for collaboration. Historically, the U.S. has developed a security presence in the region, focusing on military alliances such as AUKUS and strategic partnerships like the Quad to counter China's growing influence [44]. Conversely, the EU has pursued a more multifaceted approach and prioritised economic partnerships, sustainable development, and norms-based diplomacy while steadily increasing its security role.

Donald Trump's return to the presidency is expected to have notable implications for EU-China and Indo-Pacific relations. For Europe, Trump's resurgence brings renewed uncertainty in U.S.-EU diplomacy. European leaders worry about a shift in U.S. commitments to NATO, the weakening of transatlantic unity, and a further pivot to Asia [45]. The tough stance on China present within the first Trump administration is expected to return, increasing pressure on the EU to follow suit. Thus, as the overall rhetoric within the EU on China has become more critical in recent years, China's policy could potentially serve as a point of convergence between the US and the EU. However, for that to work in practice, the EU policy on China would have to become more united internally, as it is currently highly fragmented. Notwithstanding the rhetorical shift on China in many member states, their stances still vary significantly. Germany generally takes a more careful approach, while some smaller member states, such as Lithuania or Czechia, are highly critical. Overall, the increasingly critical rhetoric is often not followed by concrete policy steps, and economic cooperation with China is still more or less the same or steadily rising [46]. The member states' divisions thus focus on developing their approach or strategic autonomy on this issue rather than a close convergence with the US.

Conclusion

The EU's evolving Indo-Pacific strategy reflects a balancing act between addressing immediate security threats at home and maintaining a solid presence in a region critical to global trade and geopolitics. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has forced the EU to redirect resources toward European security, to some extent limiting its possibilities to strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific. However, the region's importance in terms of secure supply chains, particularly in light of growing tensions with China, compels the EU to sustain its strategic focus there. Economic diversification has become essential via more robust partnerships with India, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific nations as the EU seeks to reduce its dependency on China. Nevertheless, forging alliances in this diverse and politically complex region presents challenges, especially when dealing with non-democratic regimes, which could weaken the EU's commitment to democratic values. Finally, the new incoming Trump administration adds further uncertainty to the future developments within the region.

AUTHOR CONTACT INFORMATION

Author Contact Information

Ahmed Abdelmoula

Ahmed.abdelmoula@tttcampus.eu

Company Information

Talent Think Tank Campus Europe (TTT CAMPUS.EU)



Piazza IV Novembre 4, Milano, 20124

Tel +39 02 671658022

www.tttcampus.eu

REFERENCES

References

- [1] Gorana Grgić and Giulia Tercovich, 'Shifting Narratives? The EU's Approach to the Indo-Pacific after the War in Ukraine', *Journal of European Integration* 47, no. 1 (2 January 2025): 63-83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2361339>
- [2] Alice Billon-Galland and Hans Kundnani, 'How Ukraine Will Change Europe's Indo-Pacific Ambitions', Chatham House, 24 April 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/how-ukraine-will-change-europes-indo-pacific-ambitions>
- [3] Grgić, G., & Tercovich, G. (2025). Shifting narratives? The EU's approach to the Indo-Pacific after the war in Ukraine. *Journal of European Integration*, 47(1), 63–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2361339>
- [4] Bartsch and Wessling, 'From a China Strategy to No Strategy at All' [5] Igor Denisov et al., 'Russia, China, and the Concept of Indo-Pacific', *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 12, no. 1 (January 2021): 72-85, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521999899>
- [6] Matt Ferchen, 'Europe's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Moving Beyond US-China Rivalry and Refocusing on Asia' (Leiden Asia Centre, 2022), <https://leidenasiacentre.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/LAC-report-Europes-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>
- [7] European Commission, 'The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' (EEAS, 2021), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf
- [8] European Commission. 'The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' (EEAS, 2021), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf
- [9] EEAS, 'Coordinated Maritime Presences', EEAS, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/coordinated-maritime-presences_en
- [10] 'EU-Indonesia', European Commission, 10 January 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/indonesia/eu-indonesia-agreement_en
- [11] 'EU Trade Relations with the Philippines', European Commission, 18 March 2024, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/philippines_en
- [12] Nicholas Vinocur, Hanne Cokelaere, and Eddy Wax, '5 Things to Know about Kaja Kallas' European Parliament Hearing - POLITICO', Politico, 12 November 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/kaja-kallas-european-parliament-hearing-foreign-policy-diplomacy-estonia/>
- [13] 'A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence' (EEAS, 2022), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf

REFERENCES

- [14] 'Confirmation Hearing of Andrius KUBILIUS, Commissioner-Designate, Defence and Space', European Parliament Website, 6 November 2024, <https://acs.europarl.connectedviews.eu/embed/meeting/?refid=20241106-1830-COMMITTEE-CONFIRMATION-HEARING-A&audio=en&language=en>
- [15] Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermuelen, 'Future-Proofing EU Security and Defence Policies in the Indo-Pacific: Doubling down with Friends' (Real Instituto Elcano, 26 December 2023), <https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ari130-2023-crosson-et-al-future-proofing-eu-security-and-defence-policies-in-the-indo-pacific-doubling-down-with-friends.pdf>
- [16] European Commission. 'The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' (EEAS, 2021), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf
- [17] Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 'Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany', 2023. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/2608580/49d50fecc479304c3da2e2079c55e106/china-strategie-en-data.pdf>
- [18] Government of France, 'France's Indo-Pacific Strategy', 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_synthese_rvb_cle068e51.pdf
- [19] Government of the Netherlands, 'Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia', 2020, <https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2020/11/13/indo-pacific-guidelines>
- [20] Ben Schreer, 'Coming of Age? European Defence Engagement in the Indo-Pacific', IISS, 22 May 2024, <https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/coming-of-age-european-defence-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific/>
- [21] NATO, 'Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte Following the North Atlantic Council Briefing on the DPRK's Troop Deployment to Russia', NATO, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_230105.htm
- [22] Anushka Saxena, '75 Years of China-Russia Relations: Indeed a "No Limits" Partnership', Institute for Security and Development Policy, 27 May 2024, <https://www.isdp.eu/75-years-of-china-russia-relations-indeed-a-no-limits-partnership/>
- [23] 'China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 24 February 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/gb/202405/t20240531_11367485.html
- [24] Billon-Galland and Kundnani, 'How Ukraine Will Change Europe's Indo-Pacific Ambitions', <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/how-ukraine-will-change-europes-indo-pacific-ambitions>
- [25] Giulio Pugliese, 'The European Union's Security Intervention in the Indo-Pacific: Between Multilateralism and Mercantile Interests', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 17, no. 1 (1 January 2023): 76-98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2022.2118425>
- [26] 'Provision of Demining Machines to Ukraine', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 10 July 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000001_00415.html

REFERENCES

- [27] Aina Turillazzi and Oscar Luigi Guccion, 'Poland Flexes Its Muscles: Partnering with South Korea for Europe's Eastern Defense', German Marshall Fund of the United States, 23 October 2024, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/poland-flexes-its-muscles-partnering-south-korea-europes-eastern-defense>
- [28] Billon-Galland and Kundnani, 'How Ukraine Will Change Europe's Indo-Pacific Ambitions'.
- [29] Frederick Kliem, 'How the EU Can Still Succeed in the Indo-Pacific Despite the War in Ukraine', The Diplomat, 28 May 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/how-the-eu-can-still-succeed-in-the-indo-pacific-despite-the-war-in-ukraine/>
- [30] Pugliese, G. (2023). The European Union's Security Intervention in the Indo-Pacific: Between Multilateralism and Mercantile Interests. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 17(1), 76–98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2022.2118425>
- [31] Bernhard Bartsch and Claudia Wessling, 'From a China Strategy to No Strategy at All', 2023. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/ETNC_Report_2023_final.pdf
- [32] James Crabtree and Manisha Reuter, 'Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential', ECFR, 17 April 2024, <https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/>
- [33] Alana Ford, 'The State of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific', Indo-Pacific Analysis Briefs (Perth USAsia Centre, 2024), <https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/publications/the-state-of-democracy-in-the-indo-pacific/>
- [34] EEAS, 'EU-India: Joint Press Release on 5th Strategic Partnership Review Meeting and 10th Foreign Policy and Security Consultations in Brussels', 4 December 2024, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/eu-india-joint-press-release-5th-strategic-partnership-review-meeting-and-10th-foreign-policy-and>
- [35] Gareth Price, 'Democracy in India', Chatham House, 6 April 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/democracy-india>
- [36] Carmen Gebhard, 'The Problem of Coherence in the European Union's International Relations', in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker, 3rd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).
- [37] 'US, Australia, Japan, India Condemn Russia's Nuclear Threats', Ukrainian World Congress, 24 September 2024, <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/us-australia-japan-india-condemn-russias-nuclear-threats/>
- [38] Andrea Passeri, 'The Russia-Ukraine War Is ASEAN's Latest Political Headache', Australian Institute of International Affairs, 9 June 2023, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-russia-ukraine-war-is-aseans-latest-political-headache/>
- [39] 'The Czech Republic's Strategy For Cooperation With The Indo-Pacific' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2022), https://mzv.gov.cz/file/4922486/CZ_Strategy_Indo_Pacific_2022.pdf

REFERENCES

- [40] 'For a Secure Resilient and Prosperous Future: Lithuania's Indo-Pacific Strategy' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2023), <https://www.urm.lt/en/foreign-policy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-cooperation-with-the-indo-pacific/1219>
- [41] Government of the Netherlands, 'Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia'. <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/FOIP/20201100.O1E.html>
- [42] 'Nový zmocněnec pro Indo-Pacifik', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://mzv.gov.cz/newdelhi/cz/udalosti/novy_zmocnenec_pro_indo_pacifik.html
- [43] 'Cyber Attaché', National Cyber and Information Security Agency, accessed 20 January 2025, <https://nukib.gov.cz/en/contacts/cyber-attache/>
- [44] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, 'The Quad, AUKUS, and India's Dilemmas', Council on Foreign Relations, 13 October 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/article/quad-aukus-and-indias-dilemmas>
- [45] Alicia García-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier, 'Updating the EU Strategy on China: Co-Existence While Derisking through Partnerships', Bruegel, 25 September 2024, <https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/updating-eu-strategy-china-co-existence-while-derisking-through-partnerships>
- [46] 'China-EU - International Trade in Goods Statistics', Eurostat Official Website, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_international_trade_in_goods_statistics